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From a tourist’s perspective, one would think that every venue operating 
within a casino is owned and operated by the casino itself. The entire staff is 
friendly, helpful, able to direct you to your desired location and they all give 
the same high quality guest service. Given the uniformity of their knowledge 
and courtesy, it is easy to assume every employee is an employee of the casino. 
Restaurants, pool dayclubs, and nightclubs are advertised throughout the resort 
and the city as a whole with the casino’s trademark. Based on the image 
portrayed by the resort’s operator, it is logical to assume that all the venues 
within a resort are under its control. History also lends itself to this assumption. 
In order to own a casino, operators must apply for a gaming license.1 In the 
past, gaming licensees “owned and operated all or most of their non-gaming 
venues.”2 However, today it is common that gaming licensees often lease 
property to third-parties to own and operate the non-gaming venues within the 
greater resort.3 
Third-parties may consist of restaurants, retail shops, bars, pool dayclubs 
and nightclubs.4 These third-parties employ their own staff and operate their 
own venues—similar to a shopping mall where businesses lease spaces within 
the mall.5 Gaming licensees do not want to be liable for the actions of the third-
                                                          
1 Nev. Gaming Reg. 4.010(1) (2015). 
2 Glenn Light et al., Keeping Compliance in Check, CASINO ENTERPRISE MGMT. 
12, Nov. 2009, http://www.lrrlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/LightRutSing_ 
1109.pdf. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. 
5 For example, Hakkasan Group offers fine dining along with night and day life 
venues within casinos. See About, HAKKASAN GROUP, http://hakkasangroup.com/ 
about/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016); see also Yellowtail, HAKKASAN GROUP, http:// 
hakkasangroup.com/restaurants/yellowtail-japanese-restaurant-bar/ (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2016) (detailing a Hakkasan Group restaurant in a Las Vegas casino); The 
Bank Nightclub, HAKKASAN GROUP, http://hakkasangroup.com/nightlife-daylife/ 
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parties, therefore they draft contracts to protect the casino from liabilities that 
expressly state the gaming licensees and the lessees are not “joint employers.”6 
The idea may be that the gaming licensees are the lessors and the venue 
operators are the lessees, thus the gaming licensees are not liable for the actions 
of the venue operators. Gaming Control Board member Randy Sayre, once said 
at an informational seminar, “You could have the tightest contract on the face 
of the Earth. . . but if the property is not willing to take the necessary steps to 
enforce their rights, that’s an issue (for the board).”7 For example, N9NE 
Group owned and operated several restaurants and nightclubs in the Palms 
Hotel and Casino from 2001 to 2011.8 N9NE Group was bought out of the 
venues in 2011 to settle litigation between the casino owner, George Maloof, 
and N9NE Group co-owner, Michael Morton.9 The Palms Hotel and Casino 
was fined $1 million by the Gaming Control Board for illegal activity 
conducted by employees of several nightclubs owned and operated by N9NE 
Group.10 
Gaming licensees might be considered joint employers with its venue 
operators due to the level of indirect control the licensees have over the venue 
employees.11 Licensees assess their venues and impose certain restrictions on 
how the venues are operated.12 Additionally, licensees have some power to 
indirectly control the day-to-day operations of the venues and its employees as 
well as investigate many areas of a venue’s operations, which is incredibly 
similar to the actions of an employer.13 When applying the joint employer 
standard to the current interactions of licensees and venue operators, it is likely 
that a court would hold the licensees as joint employers of the venue 
                                                          
the-bank-nightclub/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (detailing a Hakkasan Group 
nightclub in a Las Vegas casino). 
6 Interview with Anonymous Gaming Industry Individual (2015). 
7 Arnold M. Knightly, Gaming Board Official Offers ‘Preventive’ Tips, L.V. REV.-
J. (Sept. 17, 2009, 10:00 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/gaming-
board-official-offers-preventive-tips (alteration in original) (omission in original). 
8 Steve Green, Financial Problems Preceded Former Nightclub Exec’s Apparent 
Suicide, VEGAS INC. (Nov. 25, 2011, 1:33 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/business 
/2011/nov/25/financial-problems-preceded-n9ne-group-execs-appar/ [hereinafter 
Vegas Inc. N9ne Article]; Steve Green, George Maloof, Michael Morton Reach 
Settlement, Part Ways, L.V. SUN (Jan. 4, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://lasvegassun.com/ 
news/2011/jan/04/george-maloof-michael-morton-reach-settlement-part/?_ga= 
1.165553146.478423843.1444016062. 
9 Vegas Inc. N9ne Article, supra note 8. 
10 See Chris Sieroty, Palms to Pay $1 Million Fine to Settle Drug Prostitution 
Complaint, L.V. REV.-J. (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:02 PM), http://www.reviewjournal. 
com/business/casinos-gaming/palms-pay-1-million-fine-settle-drug-prostitution-
complaint. 
11 See infra Part III.B. 
12 See Light et al., supra note 2, at 13. 
13 See id. 
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employees. This means licensees might be held liable for any and all wage and 
hour violations of venue employees. The Nevada gaming authorities might also 
hold the gaming licensees liable for federal and state labor violations of venue 
employees’ rights. 
This paper examines how the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) 
might be able to hold gaming licensees as joint employers of venue employees 
and how licensees may be individually liable for wage and hour violations of 
the venue employees. Part I details the level of control licensees have over 
venue operations and examines the wage and hour violations that occur in 
casinos. Part II discusses the Fair Labor Standards Act and the legal principles 
of a joint employer relationship. This part further applies these legal principles 
to the relationship between a gaming licensee and venue operator. Part III 
proposes ways for the gaming authorities and gaming licensees to improve the 
labor conditions of venue employees. 
The Nevada Gaming Control Board and Nevada Gaming Commission are 
diligent in protecting the gaming industry from conduct that would harm the 
general welfare and damage the public’s trust of the gaming industry.14 
Therefore, gaming licensees employ strong oversight over how a third-party 
venue operator runs his own business. Some gaming licensees give the venues’ 
employees the same hiring orientation that casino employees would receive to 
ensure a uniform standard for guest services.15 Additionally, it is recommended 
that gaming licensees require venues to employ casino security to ensure the 
safety of the patrons.16 
I. THE NEVADA GAMING CONTROL BOARD EXPECTS LICENSEES TO ASSESS 
VENUES TO ENSURE THAT THE VENUES ARE OPERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
ALL STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS. 
In 2009, the Nevada Gaming Control Board issued a letter to gaming 
licensees concerning the operation of nightclubs (the “2009 Industry Letter”).17 
The 2009 Industry Letter stated that if licensees have not done so already, they 
should make a comprehensive assessment of their venues to ensure operations 
                                                          
14 About Us, NEV. GAMING CONTROL BOARD, GAMING COMMISSION, http:// 
gaming.nv.gov/index.aspx?page=2 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
15 See Stipulation for Settlement & Order, State Gaming Control Bd. v. Mandalay 
Corp., NGC 13-03, at 4 (Mar. 11,  2014), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/show 
document.aspx?documentid=8743. 
16 See Industry Notice from Randall E. Sayre, Member, Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 
to All Nonrestricted Licensees and Interested Parties 1 (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://gaming.nv.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=5377 
(recommending nonrestricted license holders to assess the extent of “[v]enue 
security cooperation/coordination with casino security and law enforcement”) 
[hereinafter April 2009 Industry Notice]. 
17 See generally id. 
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are proper.18 Relevant areas to consider were as follows: (1) “policies, 
procedures, and internal controls;” (2) “venue security 
cooperation/coordination with casino security and law enforcement;” (3) 
“general business practices;” (4) “accounting practices (audit procedures);” and 
(5) “employee due diligence.”19 
The Board also listed assessments that some licensees have already 
implemented into their venue operations: (1) employ secret shoppers; (2) 
“interview employees;” (3) test out the legitimacy of the relevant websites 
associated with the venue; (4) “compare tickets sold through external sites with 
internal records;” (5) “evaluate door, cash bank check in/check out, tip pooling 
and distribution procedures;” (6) “compare tips reported to existing compliance 
agreements [from payroll records];” and (7) “interview management as to their 
policies and procedures regarding the handling of: incapacitated patrons, 
minors, illegal drugs, prostitution; club access for law enforcement; and 
coordination with casino security.”20 Licensees took the suggestions of the 
Board seriously as evidenced by the Board’s March 2013 Industry Letter, 
which applauded the licensees for their “significant progress in policy 
development and venue protection.”21 
Third-party operated clubs have become so common that legislation was 
approved on May 30, 2015 to amend Chapter 463 of the Nevada Revised 
Statutes to add the terms “Club venue,” “Club venue employee,” and “Club 
venue operator.”22 The legislation allows the Nevada Gaming Commission to 
develop regulations to require certain club venue employees to register with the 
Nevada Gaming Control Board similar to the way gaming employees must 
register with the Board.23 The legislation also allows for regulations to require a 
club venue operator to have a written contract with certain third-party 
contractors who provide services to club venues if the Commission decides 
such compliance is essential to further public policy.24 Certain third-party 
contractors might also be required to register with the Board.25 Lastly, the 
amendment states that a club venue employee will be deemed to be a gaming 
                                                          
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 2. 
21 Notice from A.G. Burnett, Chairman, Gaming Control Bd. & Douglas C. 
Gillespie, Sheriff, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, to All Nonrestricted Licensees 
and Interested Parties 1 (Mar. 21, 2013), http://gaming.nv.gov/Modules/Show 
Document.aspx?documentid=7696 [hereinafter March 2013 Industry Notice]. 
22 S.B. 38, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. §§ 1.4–1.6 (Nev. 2015), http://www.leg. 
state.nv.us/Session/78th2015/Bills/SB/SB38_EN.pdf; SB38, NEV. LEGISLATURE, 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/78th2015/Reports/history.cfm?ID=50 (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2016). 
23 Nev. S.B. 38 § 1.7. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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employee in regards to all the provisions of Chapter 463 and the regulations 
adopted pursuant to the amendment that apply to a gaming employee.26 It is 
significant that the amendment provides club venue employees will be deemed 
the same as a gaming employee even though the club venue employee is 
employed by a tenant of a casino licensee.27 
A. Displays of licensee control over third-party venue operations by Mandalay 
Bay Hotel & Casino and MGM Resorts International. 
MGM Resorts International (“MGM”) “operates 15 wholly owned resorts 
in the United States.”28 The company owns and operates nine casino resorts in 
Nevada and owns half of the Aria Casino Resort.29 As of December 31, 2012, 
MGM operated approximately 27% of the 150,500 guestrooms in Las Vegas.30 
It is clear that a fair amount of venue operators in Nevada are under some 
control of MGM’s policies and lease agreements. 
MGM, has always been proactive to ensure the proper operation of 
nightclubs and ultra-lounges located on its various premises.31 “[S]ince 2008, 
MGM’s Internal Audit Department. . . has performed semi-annual reviews of 
[nightclub] operations” regardless of whether it is operated by MGM or a third-
party operator.32 The reviews entail investigations for “security procedures and 
training programs directed to prohibit drugs, lewd behavior, and prostitution.”33 
Additionally, the Internal Audit Department regularly conducts random 
observations and “issues reports [which] require management responses when 
warranted.”34 
Through January 2014, the Internal Audit Department had conducted 133 
reviews of nightclubs and lounges located on MGM’s premises.35 These efforts 
included hiring two former Las Vegas Metropolitan Police officers to conduct 
                                                          
26 Id. 
27 At the time of this writing, no registration regulations were yet to be created. 
28 Profile: MGM Resorts International (MGM), REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com 
/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=MGM (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
29 Id.; Company Overview, MGM RESORTS INT’L, http://mgmresorts.investor 
room.com/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
30 MGM Resorts Int’l, MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL (MGM) 10-K filed 
3/2/2015, EDGAR ONLINE, http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/display 
filinginfo.aspx?FilingID=10529642-6624 
66165&type=sect&TabIndex=2&dcn=0001564590-15-
001180&nav=1&src=Yahoo (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
31 Stipulation for Settlement & Order, State Gaming Control Bd. v. Mandalay 
Corp., NGC 13-03, at 2 (Mar. 11, 2014), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/show 
document.aspx?documentid=8743. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 2-3. 
35 Id. at 3. 
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undercover investigations of their venues in 2012.36 Since May 2013, with the 
help of another investigative firm, MGM “conducted 34 undercover 
observations of 14 nightclubs, three dayclub pools, three lounges and 14 
bars.”37 MGM Audit and Compliance Committees routinely discuss nightclub 
issues of which they are notified.38 MGM representatives must consistently 
collaborate with the Gaming Control Board and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department to maintain nightclub activity occurring on MGM premises.39 
One specific example of MGM’s involvement with its nightclubs concerns 
the House of Blues Foundation Room (“Foundation Room”) venue located 
within the MGM-owned Mandalay Bay Hotel & Casino (“Mandalay Bay”). 
Since 2008, Mandalay Bay has required Foundation Room security and host 
employees to attend security-training programs taught by Mandalay Bay’s own 
agents.40 Immediately following a Complaint filed by the Gaming Control 
Board in 2014, MGM began a full investigation of the Foundation Room’s 
activities.41  As part of the lease agreement, MGM made notable changes to the 
lease agreement held with the Foundation Room regarding policies and 
operations of the venue.42 Among MGM’s significant changes to the lease 
agreement, MGM also required the Foundation Room to seek its approval 
before entering into contracts for services with third parties.43 MGM 
administered background checks of Foundation Room employees and 
employees of approved third-party contractors as required in another change to 
the lease.44 
The Foundation Room itself also took prompt action following the 2014 
Complaint: the Foundation Room conducted covert investigations, terminated 
six employees, and ended its relationship with some third party contractors.45 
The Foundation Room also required background checks on all third party 
contractors and stated it would do the same for future contractors.46 Foundation 
Room employees and management completed extensive zero tolerance training 
taught by Mandalay Bay’s security training officers and trained all other Las 
Vegas House of Blues employees.47 The Foundation Room also “[r]etained 
                                                          
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. 
40 Id. at 4. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 4-5. 
46 Id. at 5. 
47 See id. 
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additional senior security and compliance” employees,48 and committed to 
maintaining a relationship with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
to better anticipate issues arising from restaurants and lounges in Las Vegas.49 
The level of control that Mandalay Bay and MGM exert over their venue 
operators is high and not traditionally in character with a typical lessor—lessee 
relationship. Maintaining the reputation of the Nevada gaming industry is so 
compelling that venue operators know they must allow the gaming licensee to 
possess some control over the venue operations even though the licensee is 
simply a landlord. As demonstrated with the Foundation Room above, licensees 
have the power to amend their contract with a venue operator, require 
background checks of the venue employees, require licensee approval of the 
venue operator’s contracts with third parties, and require the venues’ 
employees to attend training sessions conducted by the licensees’ agents.50 It is 
fair to assume that MGM Resorts International is not the only licensee in 
Nevada that exercises some amount of control over their venue operations to 
ensure compliance with gaming regulations. Licensees have to pay close 
attention to their venue operations to avoid being held liable by the gaming 
authorities for their third-party venue operators’ actions. 
II. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND STATE LAWS FOR WAGE AND HOUR. 
If a venue operator violates wage and hour laws the licensee could be held 
liable for the violations by the Gaming Control Board and possibly by courts.51 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the federal minimum wage is 
$7.25 per hour.52 However, states often have their own minimum wage laws, 
entitling an employee to a higher minimum wage if set by the state.53 Under 
federal law “[c]overed nonexempt employees must receive overtime pay for 
work in excess of 40 hours per workweek “at a rate no[] less than [1.5] times 
the regular rate of pay.”54 Employers are not required to pay overtime “for 
work on weekends, holidays, or regular days of rest, unless overtime is worked 
on such days.”55 “Hours worked ordinarily include all the time during which an 
employee is required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty, or at a 
prescribed workplace.”56 
                                                          
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. at 4-5. 
51 Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.011 (2015). 
52 U.S. Dep’t of Labor–Wage & Hour Div., Compliance Assistance - Wages and 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www. 
dol.gov/whd/flsa/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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Nevada has two minimum wage standards depending on an employee’s 
health insurance coverage.57 If the employer provides no health insurance 
benefits the state minimum wage is $8.25.58 The state minimum wage is $7.25 
if the employer provides health insurance benefits and the employee receives 
these benefits.59 Nevada minimum wage is linked to a consumer price index 
and adjusts in July each year.60 In Nevada an employer is required to pay 1.5 
times an employee’s regular wage rate when an employee works more than 40 
hours in any scheduled week of work or more than 8 hours in any workday, 
whichever would happen first.61 
A. Wage and hour violations in Nevada Casinos. 
Several casinos in Nevada have allegedly been in violation of labor laws 
despite the obvious fact that federal and state law. In 2010, Station Casinos 
Inc., settled a class action suit for $1.2 million where Station Casinos failed to 
pay overtime wages for 24,000 current and former hourly employees.62 
Employees alleged that they were being deprived of proper pay due to Station 
Casino’s rounding pay system.63 Under this system, “[i]f an hourly worker 
arrives up to 14 minutes before the quarter hour, the computer automatically 
rounded that time forward to the nearest quarter hour.”64 Likewise, if the 
employee clocks out past the scheduled time, “the time is rounded back to the 
nearest quarter.”65 Thus, employees were not compensated correctly for their 
hours worked and were denied any due overtime pay.66 
Another wage dispute of a different character occurred in 2013, when 
Wynn Las Vegas card dealers filed a complaint alleging unlawful sharing of 
tips (“tip-pooling”) in the Wynn Resort Las Vegas.67 The Supreme Court of 
                                                          
57 U.S. Dep’t of Labor–Wage & Hour Div., Minimum Wage Laws in the States, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage 
/america.htm#footnote. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 608.018(1) (2014). 
62 Jocelyn Allison, Station Casinos Gets OK For $1.2M OT Settlement, LAW360 
(Oct. 27, 2010, 7:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/204838/station-casinos-
gets-ok-for-1-2m-ot-settlement. 
63 Cy Ryan, Judge Delays Ruling on Station Casinos Wage Lawsuit, L.V. SUN 
(Apr. 26, 2010, 3:10 PM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/apr/26/judge-
delays-ruling-station-casinos-wage-lawsuit/. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. For example, an employee would clock out at 8:10 p.m. but the system would 
round the time back to be 8:00 p.m., omitting the ten minutes that the employee 
worked. 
66 See id. 
67 Steve Sebelius, House Wins Again in Employee Tip-Pooling Lawsuit, L.V. REV. 
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Nevada ruled that it is lawful to take tips of employees to split with “casino 
service team leads.”68 The resort implemented this tip-pooling to encourage 
table game dealers to take salaried supervisory positions; dealers however were 
reluctant to take such positions because they would experience a pay decrease 
from the lack of tips they would receive as dealers.69 The Court reasoned that 
Nevada Revised Statute Section 608.160 does not prevent a policy where tips 
are split among employees, even though the statute would not allow an 
employer to take from their tip pool.70 The Court held the Wynn’s tip-pooling 
was not unlawful merely because tip-pooling benefits an employer by not 
having to offer higher salaries.71 
In 2014, employees of The Orleans and Gold Coast casinos, both operated 
by Boyd Gaming Corporation, alleged that their employers unlawfully failed to 
pay overtime compensation.72 The allegations were based on “the company’s 
alleged policies of rounding down employees’ time [worked] and requiring 
employees to work off-the-clock.”73 The “rounding down” claim alleged. . . the 
company’s use of a time-keeping management system. . . resulted in 
significant[]. . . time. . . rounded down,” saving the employer money, “and 
depriving [employees] of their [entitled] pay for hours worked.74 The ‘off-the-
clock’ claim [alleged]. . . employees with bank and cash handling duties were 
not paid for the [extra] time at the end of their shifts,” in which they were 
required to account for and return the cash remaining in their registers to the 
casino cage—where the casino keeps its cash.75 
The employees also claimed that the employers failed to properly pay all 
wages due to the employees after they resigned.76 Boyd Gaming moved to 
dismiss the employees’ claims for violations of the Nevada labor statutes, citing 
decisions written by United States District Court Judges James C. Mahan and 
Robert C. Jones, which “held that various sections of the applicable statutes did 
not provide a private remedy to enforce the state’s wage and hour standards.”77 
“The Court agreed, [and dismissed] the Nevada wage claims in their 
                                                          
J. (Nov. 1, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/columns-blogs/steve-
sebelius/house-wins-again-employee-tip-pooling-lawsuit. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Calder Huntington, Nevada Employees Cannot Sue For Wage Violations Under 
State Wage Statute, EMPLOYERS’ LAWYERS (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www. 
employerslawyersblog.com/2014/08/nevada-employees-cannot-sue-for-wage-
violations-under-state-wage-statute.html. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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entirety.”78 The employees were granted a conditional class certification under 
the FLSA because they alleged sufficiently similar claims in two Las Vegas 
casinos.79 The case is still ongoing because on August 13, 2015 a federal 
magistrate judge in Nevada denied the preliminary motion for settlement due to 
insufficient information regarding whether the settlement amount was fair and 
reasonable.80 
Similar to the Boyd Gaming case, The Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas Resort 
Casino, owned by Nevada Property 1, LLC, is undergoing collective class 
actions filed by employees alleging unpaid wages, unpaid overtime wages, and 
unfair overtime rate calculations.81 The company policy required employees to 
change into uniforms at the hotel prior to clocking in and clocking out before 
changing out of their uniforms.82 Employees in the Cosmopolitan’s Slot 
Operations Department who were required to have keys, radios, or pouch funds 
to perform job duties were required to obtain the items before clocking in, and 
to clock out before returning the items.83 This was evidenced by the Slot 
Operations Department’s written policy and was in effect until July 2012.84 
Despite a written policy stating otherwise, an employee who worked at the 
Cosmopolitan’s pizzeria declared that her manager stated it was company 
policy for employees with a cash bank to receive their cash bank prior to 
clocking in and to return the bank funds after clocking out.85 Employees also 
argued that their $8.00 lunch stipend should have been included with their 
regular pay in order to calculate what overtime rate to pay the employees.86 
Although the policy was written to comply with labor laws stating employees 
must clock in and then obtain their cash bank, one employee declared she was 
directed by her manager to obtain her cash bank before clocking in and the 
casino is alleged to be in violation with the law.87 
                                                          
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Ronald Miller, Casino Workers’ Collective Wage Settlement Rejected; Court 
Can’t Tell If Fair and Reasonable, WOLTERS KLUWER, http://www.employment 
lawdaily.com/index.php/news/casino-wage-settlement-rejected-court-unable-to-
determine-if-fair-and-reasonable/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
81 Lewis v. Nev. Property 1, LLC, No. 2:12–cv–01564–MMD–GWF, 2013 WL 
237098, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2013). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *3. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at *10. 
86 Id. at *11. 
87 Id. at *10. 
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B. Potential violations of federal and state labor laws that may occur in third-
party owned venues. 
Many people who work in Las Vegas’s entertainment and hospitality 
industry make a majority of their income from tips.88 However, employers 
should ensure their employees are paid fairly for hours worked. Typically, 
employees of dayclub and nightclub venues only work three days per week and 
will not receive health benefits.89 Because day and nightclub venues are only 
open three days a week, it is fair to assume, for hypothetical reasons, that venue 
operators require employees to work double shifts.90 If a cocktail server worked 
a six-hour day shift, and came back three hours later, to work a six-hour night 
shift she would have worked twelve hours in one twenty-four hour period. 
Under Nevada law, that server would be entitled to receive four of her hours 
worked at 1.5 times her regular pay rate.91 
Overtime hours are simple to meet, even within a three-day workweek. For 
example, if two days are ten-hour shifts and the third day is a twenty-hour day, 
or if this hypothetical busser is called in on his day off to work, overtime may 
start accruing.92 Also, if an employer directs the bussers to clock out after an 
eight-hour shift and continue to work without compensation, it would be a 
violation of federal and state labor laws.93 In speaking to individuals in the club 
industry, the author learned that some dayclub and nightclub venues require 
their employees to attend weekly nights out to support other nightclub venues.94 
The weekly nights out should be paid and accounted for when the employer 
determines whether overtime pay is required under federal and state laws. 
It is also easy for restaurant operators to violate wage and labor laws. If an 
employee is required to clock-out and continues to work, such as finishing up a 
table, polishing glasses, or folding napkins, the employer would be in violation 
                                                          
88 For example, a cocktail server at a lounge within Caesar’s Palace could make up 
to $100,000, whereas the average pay for union servers working on the strip is $21 
per hour. Matt Finn, Day in Life of Vegas Cocktail Waitress, FOX NEWS (May 12, 
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2014/05/12/day-in-life-vegas-cocktail-
waitress/; see also Monica Kim, A Cold Look at Working in Sin City’s Hottest 
Club, CONDÉ NAST TRAVELER (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.cntraveler.com/ 
stories/2013-04-23/undercover-jobs-cocktail-waitress-vegas-club  
(Marquee nightclub cocktail servers make from $500-$1,000 per night in tips). 
89 See Kim, supra note 88 (In 2013, Marquee nightclub was only open three days 
per week). 
90 This assumption is made because it is easier to manage one set of employees for 
a club that operates only three days per week than to have two sets of employees 
for only three days of operation. 
91 See Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 608.018(1)(b) (2014). 
92 See id. § 608.018(1). 
93 See id. § 608.018(1)(b). 
94 Interview with Anonymous Nightclub Worker (2015). 
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of federal law.95 Although an employee agrees to clock-out and not be paid for 
the extra time worked performing restaurant duties, the employee is still 
entitled to overtime pay if she has worked over 40 hours in one work week.96 
Some restaurants on the Las Vegas Strip will continue to seat customers almost 
near closing time and require their employees to stay and serve the guests. The 
server, busser, bartender, and manager might have to wait for the table to 
finish. If the employees are told by management to clock-out and wait for the 
last table to leave, the employer would be in violation of state and federal labor 
laws.97 
C. Licensees contract with third parties to operate venues to avoid union 
involvement. 
The Culinary Union has fought for many hotel and casino workers’ rights 
throughout its history in Las Vegas.98 The Culinary Union led more than 
17,000 workers to protest 32 resorts on the Las Vegas strip in 1984.99 After 
picketing for nine months, 900 workers were arrested and six casinos cut all 
ties with the union.100 One possible reason or positive factor that may 
incentivize licensees to lease space to third-parties is to avoid union 
involvement. As a former restaurant employee, the author has seen firsthand 
how challenging it is for an employer to terminate an employee who is 
protected by the Culinary Union. There are extra steps taken just to discipline 
an employee; e.g. a labor representative would have to be present (upon the 
employee’s request) during the manager’s conversation with his employee 
regarding employee discipline.101 Some managers might even keep poor 
                                                          
95 See Records to be Kept by Employers, 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.0–.34 (2015); U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor: Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #21: Recordkeeping Requirements 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (July 2008), http://www.dol.gov/whd 
/regs/compliance/whdfs21.pdf (advising employers that they should keep daily 
records of how many hours an employee worked) Causing a person to clock-out 
and continue working would not accurately track hours worked. 
96 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Wage & Hour Div., Overtime Pay, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime_pay.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (“Unless 
exempt, employees covered by the Act must receive overtime pay for hours worked 
over 40 in a workweek at a rate not less than time and one-half their regular rates of 
pay.”). 
97 See supra note 95. 
98 See Ed Komenda, The Culinary Union: A History of Striking, VEGAS INC. (July 
15, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://vegasinc.com/business/gaming/2013/jul/15/culinary-
union-history-striking/. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Your Rights, CULINARY WORKERS UNION LOCAL226, http://www.culinary 
union226.org/members/contract/your-rights (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (“Until 
your union representative is present, you may refuse to answer any questions that 
could be used by your supervisor to discipline you.”). At least one Culinary Union 
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performing employees on payroll just to avoid litigation with the labor union (if 
the employees were terminated). If there had been union involvement in the 
previous hypotheticals, the employees might be more aware of their rights and 
refuse to clock-out and continue to work. Even if the employees comply with 
management orders by continuing to work after clocking-out, an employee 
would have access to a union representative that could assert the employee’s 
entitlement to overtime pay.102 As such, the benefits of union agreements with 
gaming licensees for employees would possibly incentivize them to unionize, 
something the licensee would likely wish to avoid.103 
When a casino enters into a collective bargaining agreement with a 
union—it is less likely that wage laws will be violated because the agreement 
offers workers higher pay than non-union workers.104 The union agreements are 
costly to employers; they can include holiday pay, such as twice the regular pay 
rate if the employee works on a holiday and regular pay for an employee even 
if the employee did not work on the holiday.105 Union involvement can also 
have expenses associated with hiring legal counsel to negotiate with the union 
and to settle employee grievances.106 The perceived negative burdens that 
union involvement place upon a licensee may be a reason to why they might 
want third parties to own and operate venues on licensee premises. 
Furthermore, if a gaming licensee leases space to a third-party to operate a 
venue, the licensee enjoys the benefits of the third party’s expertise in the 
                                                          
bargaining agreement requires employers to take progressive discipline before 
terminating an employee and notify the union in writing within 72 hours of 
termination. Collective Bargaining Agreement between GNLV Corp. dba Golden 
Nugget Hotel & Casino and Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas (Culinary Workers 
Union, Local 226 and Bartenders Union, Local 165) 6–7 (June 1, 2002), 
https://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/cba/pdf/cbrp0792.pdf  
[hereinafter Collective Bargaining Agreement]. 
102 See Our Union, CULINARY WORKERS UNION LOC. 226, http://www.culinary 
union226.org/union/history (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (“Chartered in 1935, the 
Culinary Union has been a leader in the fight for decent wages, better working 
conditions, family health insurance and secure pensions.”). 
103 See, e.g., Michelle Chen, No Surprise: Trump is a Union Buster at His Own 
Hotel, THE NATION (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/no-surprise-
trump-is-a-union-buster-at-his-own-hotel/ (detailing a unionization campaign at the 
Trump Hotel (a non-gaming property) located just off the Las Vegas Strip). 
104 See Ana Ley, Time is Money in Class-Action Suit, L.V. SUN (June 1, 2014, 2:00 
AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2014/jun/01/time-money-class-action-suit/ 
(“Overtime wage disputes ‘would never happen to employers working in the 
Culinary Union . . . . They’ve got a big, strong union that looks out for workers.’”); 
see also Chen, supra note 103. 
105 See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 101, at 15. 
106 For example, if an employee was terminated for poor work performance but 
wanted to claim she was in a protected class, the union could support her and allege 
the violation where the casino would have to defend itself. 
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venue and the licensee does not have to engage with labor unions.107 Avoiding 
union involvement keeps the casino’s cost of doing business down as well as 
the venue operator’s costs—as noted earlier, union agreements often include 
higher pay for employees.108 Without union agreements the venue operator can 
keep its employment costs down. If the employee does not know her rights, and 
feels she has no leverage with which to go against her employer, she will likely 
continue to work and not ask for overtime pay that she is entitled to. She also 
would not enjoy the benefits of union agreements, such as holiday pay. This is 
important to day/nightclub and restaurant venues because Las Vegas is busiest 
on holiday weekends.109 If the venue operators were required to pay holiday 
pay for all their employees, and pay overtime wages for hours worked over 
eight hours in one day or 40 hours worked in one week,110 the operators would 
almost certainly see a difference in profits. 
III. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND THE JOINT EMPLOYER 
STANDARD 
Gaming licensees should be well informed of the FLSA and the joint 
employer standard because it might apply to them with regard to their venue 
operators’ employees. There is a possibility that a licensee could be held liable 
for wage and hour violations of a venue’s employees if a court believes the 
licensee and venue operator acted as joint employers. On August 27, 2015, the 
NLRB in a 3-2 decision overruled TLI Inc., and applied a more liberal joint 
employer standard.111 Now, a joint employer relationship could be found even 
where sufficient control over the terms and conditions of employment has been 
exercised indirectly, such as through an intermediary.112 The Board added, “[i]t 
is not the goal of joint-employer law to guarantee the freedom of employers to 
insulate themselves from their legal responsibility to workers, while 
maintaining control of the workplace.”113 This new ruling may make it more 
likely that gaming licensees can be found to be joint employers if they exercise 
                                                          
107 See Howard Stutz, Palms’ Decision to Turn Over Restaurants to Outside 
Operator Sparks Dispute, L.V. R.-J. (Sept. 10, 2015, 3:02 PM), http://www.review 
journal.com/business/casinos-gaming/palms-decision-turn-over-restaurants-
outside-operator-sparks-dispute. The local Culinary Union claims the Palms Casino 
contracted with a third-party operator to oversee dining venues in efforts to avoid 
having employees unionize. See id. 
108 See e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 101, at 15. 
109 See generally Holiday Weekends | Las Vegas Nightclubs & Vegas Pool Parties, 
VEGAS POOL SEASON (last visited Sept. 22, 2015), https://vegaspoolseason.com/ 
holiday-weekends. 
110 NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.018 (2015). 
111 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 1, 22, 16 (Aug. 27, 
2015). 
112 Id. at 2. 
113 Id. at 21. 
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sufficient control over the terms and conditions of employment of venue 
employees.114 
The FLSA prescribes basic standards that employers must adhere to 
regarding minimum wage and overtime pay.115 The FLSA regulations provide 
that all joint employers are individually liable for violations of the Act.116 Joint 
employer relationships are found in situations “[w]here one employer is acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer. . . in relation to the 
employee[,] or [w]here the employers are not completely disassociated with 
respect to the employment of a particular employee.”117 The joint employers 
“may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by 
reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with the other employer.”118 
[I]f the facts establish that the employee is employed jointly by two or more 
employers, i.e., that employment by one employer is not completely 
disassociated from employment by the other employer(s), all of the 
employee’s work for all of the joint employers during the workweek is 
considered as one employment for purposes of the Act. . . . [A]ll joint 
employers are responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with 
all of the applicable provisions of the act, including the overtime provisions, 
with respect to the entire employment for the particular workweek.119 
 The FLSA defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”120 An 
“employee” defined by the FLSA is “any individual employed by an 
employer.”121 
In Industrial Personnel Corporation v. NLRB, the court held joint 
employment existed between a transportation services operator and a 
manufacturer of tires.122 The court arrived at this decision in part because 
Goodrich, the manufacturer, had a cost-plus lease terminable with thirty days’ 
notice with Industrial Personnel Corporation (“IPC”), the transportation 
services operator, and could reasonably be perceived to have some control over 
wages that could be bargained for between IPC and the union representing the 
drivers.123 Although Goodrich was not directly involved with the collective 
bargaining agreement the court found some control was exerted over wages 
                                                          
114 See id. at 2. 
115 The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov 
/compliance/laws/comp-flsa.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
116 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2015). 
117 Id. § 791.2(b)(2)–(3). 
118 Id. § 791.2(b)(3). 
119 Id. § 791.2(a). 
120 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2013). 
121 Id. § 203(e)(1). 
122 Indus. Pers. Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 226, 227, 229 (8th Cir. 1981). 
123 Id. at 229. 
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because the employer refused to offer employees a higher wage for fear of 
losing the shipper as a lessee.124 In Hoskins Ready-Mix Concrete, a third party 
had a contract with the employer where the third party had the contractual 
power to exercise some control over the operations.125  Although the power was 
not exercised by the third party, the NLRB held that exercising control arising 
from a contract or a control existing within a contract but not exercised are 
separate indicia of joint employment and each can support a finding of joint 
employment.126 
In NLRB v. Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., the industrial realities of a coal 
company created a joint employer relationship between Jewell and Horn & 
Keene (who mined the property owned by Jewell), because there was 
significant evidence that Jewell acted as an employer over the Horn & Keene’s 
employees.127 Jewell provided the land that the miners worked on, workman’s 
compensation coverage on workers in its mines, engineering services and 
safety inspections of the mines, and electricity to the mine.128 The NLRB 
looked at the totality of the circumstances of each case to determine whether a 
joint employer relationship was created although the two contracting parties 
may not have intended to act as joint employers.129 
A. Bonnette factors that establish a joint employer relationship. 
In Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated that “[t]he definition of employer . . . is to be given an expansive 
interpretation in order to effectuate the FLSA’s broad remedial purposes.”130 
The federal minimum wage and overtime enforcement provisions have three 
basic purposes: (1) compensation of individual employees for their work; (2) 
preventing employers from gaining an unfair advantage in commerce by 
withholding rightfully due compensation of employees; and (3) prevention of 
future minimum wage and overtime violations.131 Courts must consider the 
totality of the circumstances of the relationship between employees and alleged 
                                                          
124 See id. 
125 Hoskins Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1492, 1493 (Dec. 5, 1966). 
126 See id. at 1493 n. 2 (quoting NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908, 913 
(8th Cir. 1954)). 
127 See NLRB v. Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., 435 F.2d 1270, 1271-72 (4th Cir. 
1970) (stating that coal processor exhibited de facto control over another 
company’s workers by providing engineering services, safety inspections, and 
electricity). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1271. 
130 Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
131 Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1466 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
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employers.132 Thus, “[e]conomic realities, not contractual labels, determine 
employment status for the remedial purposes of the FLSA.”133 Some factors a 
court may consider when evaluating the economic reality of an alleged joint 
employment relationship are “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power 
to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work 
schedules or conditions of payment, (3) determined the rate and method of 
payment, and (4) maintained employment records.”134 “However, no single 
factor is dispositive—the Court may ultimately conclude that there was no joint 
employment, even where some factors weigh in favor of finding joint 
employment.”135 
In Bureerong v. Uvawas, Thai immigrants alleged minimum wage and 
overtime violations from 1988 to 1995 by a garment facility operated by 
several entities, which they deemed “operators.”136 The Secretary of Labor filed 
suit against the operators.137 The Thai immigrants also filed another suit against 
the “manufacturers,” the entities that contracted with the operators.138 The 
manufacturers claimed the suit should be dismissed because if they were “joint 
employers” then the first suit filed by the Secretary of Labor precluded the 
plaintiffs from filing a second suit against the manufacturers.139 The court 
rejected this argument and allowed the plaintiffs to pursue the second suit 
against the manufacturers.140 
The manufacturers were “clearly removed” from what transpired in the 
actual facility, had no “power to hire or fire the employees,” and did not 
“directly supervise[] or control[] work schedules or conditions.”141 Despite all 
these factors, the court “must construe the provisions of the FLSA expansively 
and look to the economic realities of the relationship between the parties.”142 
The court held the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an employment relationship 
with the contracting “manufacturers” within the meaning of the FLSA.143 The 
                                                          
132 See Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. 
133 Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979). 
134 See Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 (quoting Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare 
Agency, 525 F.Supp. 128, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 
1983). The 9th Circuit held that “[t]he four factors considered by the district court 
provide a useful framework for analysis in this case, but they are not etched in 
stone and will not be blindly applied.” Id. 
135 Nissenbaum v. NNH Cal Neva Servs. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1250–51 (D. 
Nev. 2013) (citing Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
136 Bureerong, 922 F.Supp. at 1459. 
137 Id. at 1464. 
138 Id. at 1460. 
139 Id. at 1464–65. 
140 Id. at 1467. 
141 See id. at 1468. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 1469. 
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court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second cause of 
action because the Plaintiffs successfully pled that the “manufacturers” and 
“operators” were the Plaintiffs’ “joint” employers.144 Regardless of the lack of 
direct control, the court still found a joint employer relationship in the early 
stages of the complaint.145 
Sometimes a court might choose not to follow the Board’s decision and 
decide a case differently. Even if the NLRB decides a gaming licensee is a joint 
employer with its venue operator, a court might not agree and choose not to 
enforce the Board’s decision. In New York New York, LLC v. NLRB, the New 
York New York resort contracted with a third-party, Ark, to operate restaurant 
venues on its premises.146 Three off-duty Ark employees decided to handbill 
outside the entrance of New York New York.147  The handbills asked guests to 
encourage Ark to negotiate with the union.148 New York New York had the Ark 
employees removed from the property and stated they were private 
trespassers.149 
Despite a contracting relationship, the NLRB found that employees of a 
third-party contractor had employee rights to organize on New York New 
York’s property.150  The NLRB decided that New York New York violated the 
Ark employees’ Section 7 rights of the National Labor Relations Act, which 
gives employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations.”151 The Court reasoned that Section 8(a)(1) makes it an “‘unfair 
labor practice’ for an employer to ‘interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees 
in the exercise’” of the Section 7 rights.152 “Employee,” as defined by the Act, 
includes “any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a 
particular employer.”153 However, the court did not see eye to eye with the 
NLRB’s actions.154  Since Ark employees were employed by Ark and not New 
York-New York, the court refused to enforce the NLRB’s decision that 
                                                          
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 New York New York, LLC v. NLRB, 313 F.3d 585, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
147 Id. 
148 See id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 587. 
151 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013). 
152 New York New York, 313 F.3d at 587 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2013)); 
see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2013). 
153 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2013). 
154 See New York New York, 313 F.3d at 590–91 (pointing out the NLRB did not 
explain why Ark employees should be afforded the same rights as New York-New 
York employees, the court stated “No Supreme Court case decides whether the 
term ‘employee’ extends to the relationship between an employer and the 
employees of a contractor working on its property.”). 
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employees of a contractor had the right to be on the property of another.155 
Thus, even if the Board decides that a joint employer relationship exists 
between a gaming licensee and a nightclub operator located on its premises, a 
court may refuse to follow the Board’s decision and find differently.156 
Joint employment can be found when one employer contracting in good 
faith with an independent company still retains sufficient control of the terms 
and conditions of employment of the independent company’s employees.157 In 
Hamburg Industries, joint employment was found where the user firm required 
the supplier firm’s employees to follow its plant safety rules and regulations.158 
Joint employment was also found in NLRB v. Jewell, where the Horn & Keene 
miners were required to follow safety rules and undergo safety inspections of 
Jewell Corporation.159 In NLRB v. Greyhound Corporation, Greyhound was 
found to be joint employers of the janitors and porters employed by Floors, 
because Greyhound possessed sufficient control over the employees’ work.160 
B. The amount of supervision licensees need to place on venue operators may 
result in a finding of joint employment. 
The gaming licensees may appear to be a joint employer from a venue 
employee’s perspective. After all, some gaming licensees give hiring 
orientations to the venue operators’ employees and some gaming licensees now 
incorporate their own security employees into nightclubs to ensure the safety of 
the patrons, who are also patrons of the casino.161 One would not think that a 
lease agreement would impose liability to the landlord, or authorize a landlord 
to step in and operate certain functions of the venue as a joint owner. However, 
continuing incidents have occurred to create this need for oversight of venue 
operations, and without it, gaming licensees would continue to be fined 
$500,000 per violation of its venue operators’ actions.162 
This is a very interesting relationship because the venue operators need to 
comply with the orders of the gaming licensees.163 Gaming licensees lease 
                                                          
155 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
156 See generally id. 
157 Walter B. Cooke, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 626, 640 (1982). 
158 Hamburg Indus., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 67, 67–68 (1971). 
159 See N.L.R.B. v. Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., 435 F.2d 1270, 1271–72 (4th Cir. 
1970). 
160 N.L.R.B. v. Greyhound Corp. (S. Greyhound Lines Div.), 368 F.2d 778, 780–81 
(5th Cir. 1966). 
161 Stipulation for Settlement & Order, State Gaming Control Bd. v. Mandalay 
Corp., NGC 13-03, at 4, (March 11, 2014), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/show 
document.aspx?documentid=8743. 
162 See id. at 1 (stipulating a settlement of $500,000). 
163 See Light et al., supra note 2. 
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properties to tenants and in a sense advise them on how to run their business.164 
Although this is a big imposition on the part of the gaming licensees, they run 
the risk of heavy fines and losing their gaming licenses if the venue operators 
do not comply with the gaming regulations.165 Gaming licensees have been 
held liable for the unlawful actions of their venue operators—violations of state 
and federal labor law could be another liability.166 
1. Licensee assessments of venue operations may indicate a joint employer 
relationship. 
Currently, the Gaming Control Board expects gaming licensees to consider 
many areas of a venue’s operation.167 The Industry Letters are very nightclub 
specific but it can apply to other third party venues such as restaurants and 
lounges. As mentioned earlier in the 2009 Industry Letter, some licensees have 
already implemented assessments of their third party operators.168 However, the 
Board would still like greater diligence from more licensees in reviewing their 
relationships with such vendors, including “policies, procedures, and internal 
controls” of the venue operator; visiting and investigating locations as typical 
customers; “interview[ing] employees”; “interview[ing] management as to their 
policies and procedures regarding the handling of incapacitated patrons, 
minors, illegal drugs, [and] prostitution”; assessing club access for police; and 
assessing venue “coordination with casino security.”169 For instance, in Trans-
State Lines, Inc., the NLRB found a trucking company to be joint employers 
with fleet companies where the fleet owner screened applicants applying for 
jobs with fleet companies, disclosed to fleet owners which applicants the 
trucking company approved of, and handled dispatching from certain 
locations.170 Similar to Trans-State Lines, Inc., the Gaming Control Board 
suggests that gaming licensees also screen the employees and management of 
venue operations—an act that might support a finding that licensees are joint 
                                                          
164 The April 9, 2012 Industry Notice states regardless of the contractual agreement 
with venues, licensees must ensure operations are proper; to do so would be to 
advise the venue operator on proper operations. See Notice from Mark A. 
Lipparelli, Chairman, Gaming Control Bd. & Douglas C. Gillespie, Sheriff, Las 
Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, to All Nonrestricted Licensee & Interested Parties (Apr. 
9, 2012), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid= 
3451 [hereinafter April 2012 Industry Notice]. 
165 See id. 
166 See Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.011(8) (2015) (permitting disciplinary actions when a 
licensee fails to comply with federal, state, or local laws). 
167 See March 21, 2013, Industry Letter, NEV. GAMING CONTROL BD. 1 (Mar. 21, 
2013), http://gaming.nv.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=7696. 
168 April 2009 Industry Notice, supra note 16, at 2. 
169 Id. 
170 Trans-States Lines, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 648, 649 (1981). 
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employers of venue employees.171 
Gaming licensees are expected to monitor areas of venue operations that 
deal with revenue, such as the following: “[c]ompare tickets sold through 
external sites with internal records;” whether doormen are accepting cash tips; 
evaluate door cash bank in-and-out; “tip pooling and distribution procedures;” 
“accounting practices;” and tip reporting according to existing compliance 
agreements from payroll records.172  In Jewell, the court stated that the 
company’s safety inspections of the coal mines was a factor that contributed to 
its status as a joint employer.173 Similar to the situation in Jewell, gaming 
licensees inspect the venue operations by shopping the venues to prevent illegal 
activity, auditing payroll records to ensure tax compliance, and inspecting 
accounting practices.174 
When applying these facts to the joint employer standard, it appears that a 
joint employer relationship could be established between a gaming licensee and 
its venue operator.175 If several employers “exert substantial control” over a 
group of employees and “it can be shown that they share or co-determine [the] 
matters governing [the] essential terms and conditions of employment—they 
constitute ‘joint employers’ within the meaning of the NLRA.”176 If a gaming 
licensee were to require venue employees to submit to drug testing it may be 
evidence of joint employment because drug testing is an essential term to one’s 
employment. From the perspective of the Board, it may be sufficient evidence 
that gaming licensees are joint employers because they would not have the 
power otherwise to directly or indirectly require venue employees to submit to 
testing. 
Licensees interviewing their third party venue managers as to their policies 
and procedures, as well as interviewing venue employees, may be construed as 
directing the venue operators’ day-to-day activities. If a gaming licensee does 
not agree with the venue management’s policies and procedures, the licensee 
can request the management to modify the policies and procedures to better 
comply with gaming regulations, which may be considered evidence of control 
over venue operations.177 
                                                          
171 April 2009 Industry Notice, supra note 16, at 1–2. See also Trans-States Lines, 
Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. at 649. 
172 April 2009 Industry Notice, supra note 16. 
173 NLRB v. Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., 435 F.2d 1270, 1271–72 (4th Cir. 
1970). 
174 See April 2009 Industry Notice, supra note 16. 
175 See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2015). 
176 NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3rd Cir. 
1982). 
177 As with the Foundation Room situation within Mandalay Bay, the venue’s 
policy was insufficient and the lease was modified to ensure proper operations. 
Stipulation for Settlement & Order, State Gaming Control Bd. v. Mandalay Corp., 
NGC 13-03, at 2–5 (Mar. 11, 2014), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument 
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Yet more potential evidence of a joint employment relationship concerns 
employee discipline.  If a gaming licensee interviews a venue’s employee and 
feels the employee may have the tendency or potential to conduct illegal 
activity during employment, the licensee could notify the venue operator’s 
management, and indirectly have the employee terminated or not hired.178 Like 
in Trans-State Lines, Inc., the gaming licensees can screen venue employees 
and have an effect on their employment.179 By applying the same reasoning as 
the Board in Trans-State Lines, Inc., the level of control that gaming licensees 
have over venue employees may grant them joint employer status with the 
venue operators.180 Therefore, gaming licensees could possibly be held liable 
for any wage and hour violations that occur during the venue employees’ 
course of employment. 
This gaming licensee and venue operator relationship is distinguishable 
from TLI, Inc., where the Board did not find that the level of control exercised 
by one party did not seem to rise to the level of a joint employer.181 In TLI, Inc., 
a client leased drivers from a third party, a leasing agency.182 The client 
reserved the power and responsibility to “maintain[] operational control, 
direction and supervision” over the leasing agency’s drivers in the lease 
contract.183 These powers and responsibilities included “scheduling and 
dispatching of the drivers,” giving directions, procedures for loading and 
unloading, and all other matters related to day-to-day operations.184 However, 
the client would file incident reports with the driver’s employer whenever the 
driver’s conduct was adverse to the client’s operations, and the employer would 
investigate and determine the disciplinary actions.185 The client participated in 
the collective bargaining session with the leasing agency and the drivers’ union 
where it made clear that the lease agreement would be jeopardized if 
transportation costs were not reduced.186 However, the “specific savings. . . 
                                                          
.aspx?documentid=8743. 
178 Because licensees are responsible for bad acts performed by venue operators and 
their employees, it makes sense that a licensee’s judgment regarding a venue 
employee’s character would carry significant weight in deciding whether to hire or 
fire a person. See March 2013 Industry Notice, supra note 21 (“[L]icensee[s] will 
be held responsible for the actions occurring on its premises regardless of the 
association or contractual agreements between the licensee and a lessee or third part 
[sic] operator/manager.”). 
179 See Trans-States Lines, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 648, 649 (1981). 
180 See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a). 
181 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 799 (1984). 
182 Id. at 801. 
183 Id. at 799 (quoting the lease agreement between Crown Zellerbach Corp. and 
TLI, Inc.) (Member Dennis, concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
184 Id. (quoting the lease agreement between Crown Zellerbach Corp. and TLI, Inc.) 
(Member Dennis, concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
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were left entirely to [the leasing agency] and the Union to work out.”187  This 
stringent TLI, Inc. standard has since been overruled and a more liberal 
standard has been implemented to account for the current state of employment 
where many people work for temp agencies.188Under the prior framework, the 
Board found the control exercised was not sufficient to hold the client as a joint 
employer189—this is expressly overruled now and even indirect control may 
create a joint employer relationship.190 
Unlike TLI, Inc., the gaming licensee as a lessor exercises more control 
over its venue operators than the client had with the leasing agency. Licensees 
can revoke contracts if the venue operators conduct egregious acts on licensee 
premises.191 Some licensees facilitate training sessions and conduct background 
checks on venue employees.192  Furthermore, some even require the venue 
operator to ask for permission to contract with a third party for services in 
which licensees will conduct background checks of the new third-party’s 
employees.193 The level of control that gaming licensees impose on their venue 
operators far exceeds the minimal control that the client had in TLI, Inc.194 
Given that the joint employer standard used in TLI, Inc. has only been even 
more relaxed,195 it is likely that the NLRB would find licensees, which exert 
this substantial amount of control, to be joint employers. 
2. Regardless of the joint employer standard, licensees can still be held 
                                                          
187 Id. 
188 See Board Issues Decision in Browning-Ferris Industries, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD. 
(Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-issues-
decision-browning-ferris-industries. 
189 See generally TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. at 799. 
190 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 1–2 (2015); Id. at 
25 (Members Miscimarra & Johnson, dissenting) (“The majority today expressly 
overrules TLI, Laerco, Airborne Express, AM Property, supra and related 
precedent, and purports to return to a joint-employer test that allegedly applied 
prior to this line of precedent.”). 
191 See Light et al., supra note 2 (stating that a licensee is expected to make sure 
that contractual relations with venue operators are in compliance with regulations). 
192 See, e.g., Stipulation for Settlement & Order, State Gaming Control Bd. v. 
Mandalay Corp., NGC 13-03, at 5 (Mar. 11, 2014), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/ 
showdocument.aspx?documentid=8743. 
193 Id. at 4. 
194 See supra, Part III.B.1. The client in TLI, Inc. could file incident reports with 
the employer whenever a driver’s conduct was not proper. TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 
at 799. However, the need to prevent improper conduct by venue employees is 
much stronger because licensees bear the responsibility of improper operations. See 
April 2009 Industry Notice, supra note 16. Therefore, licensees must maintain 
significant oversight of venues to prevent bad behavior, much more than the TLI, 
Inc. where drivers were simply dispatched by the client. See TLI, Inc., 271 
N.L.R.B. at 798. 
195 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. at 1–2. 
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liable and must ensure the venues are operated in accordance with 
all federal and state laws and regulations. 
Licensees are responsible for any venue operators’ violation of laws or 
regulations that occur on licensee premises.196 Licensees should take necessary 
steps to protect the wage and hour rights of venue employees as if the 
employees were their own. If venue operators are to comply with federal laws, 
then a wage and overtime violation is in violation of Regulation 5.011 and the 
gaming licensee is responsible for the violation.197 
Regardless of the association or contractual agreement between the licensee, a 
lessee or a third party operator/manager; it remains the responsibility of the 
licensee to ensure operations conducted on its premises are run in accordance 
with all local, state and federal laws and gaming regulations. The Board is 
continuing its focus on this important matter and we intend to hold the 
licensee accountable for breaches of this responsibility.198 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Wage and hour audits of venue employees should be added to the list of 
areas that the Gaming Control Board expects gaming licensees to assess. As 
discussed earlier, gaming licensees are expected to inspect many areas of venue 
operations that deal with revenue.199 It is possible that if the gaming authorities 
had enhanced awareness of these wage and hour violations, then there would be 
an increased expectation on licensees to audit these activities. 
Labor violations are important to society in other areas regarding goods 
and how workers are treated in the process of producing the goods. Considering 
how much revenue is earned in the gaming industry,200 depriving venue 
employees of their entitled pay is an unfair labor practice and should not be 
tolerated. It is within the gaming authorities’ discretion to implement a wage 
and hour audit in addition to the many other areas that the authorities already 
expect licensees to audit.201 This will allow gaming authorities to hold licensees 
liable for the aforementioned violations of federal and state labor laws. In order 
                                                          
196 Light et al., supra note 2. 
197 Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.011 (2015). 
198 April 2012 Industry Notice, supra note 164. 
199 See April 2009 Industry Notice, supra note 16, at 1. 
200 See generally Robert Ferris, These 13 States Raked in $34B in Gaming Revenue, 
USA TODAY, (April 27, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
business/2014/04/27/top-gambling-states/8168681/ (stating that Nevada generated 
$10.86 billion in 2012). 
201 See Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.010 (2015). This regulation requires licensees to act in 
a manner that does not bring disrepute to the industry or the state, the failure to 
properly pay employees is bad for public policy and the Board could direct 
licensees to implement wage and hour audits to ensure proper pay for hours 
worked. See id.; see also Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.011(8). 
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to protect the general welfare of the public and maintain public trust of the 
gaming industry, licensees should take necessary actions to ensure that venue 
employees are not having their rights infringed.202 Also licensees might be held 
as joint employers when venue employees allege wage and hour complaints.203 
If so the NLRB might hold licensees individually liable for the unfair labor 
practices that occur in the Nevada gaming industry. 
The opposition may argue that this new standard would create a loss of 
employment opportunities. In reality, rather than create a loss of employment, it 
will more likely affect the operator’s profits. However, many would probably 
agree that the public policy of paying employees for work performed justifies a 
slight decrease in profits. The revenue will still be the same, the quality of life 
will be better for the employee, and the employer might have slightly less 
money in its pocket than previous years. Other positive outcomes from 
ensuring employee protection is the potential for decreased litigation with 
employees (and the costs associated with it) and protection of gaming licensees 
from liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Nevada gaming authorities expect gaming licensees to maintain public 
trust in the gaming industry.204 All acts occurring on gaming licensees’ 
premises must be in accordance with all federal and state laws and 
regulations.205 Even if third party venue operators are the cause of the improper 
conduct, the Nevada gaming authorities will hold the gaming licensees 
liable.206 Some proactive licensees regulate the venue operations in many 
different areas as an employer would. As discussed earlier, there are lawsuits 
within Las Vegas where employees alleged wage and hour violations regarding 
unpaid work time, unpaid overtime, unfair tip pooling, and unfair time 
calculation.207 
The Fair Labor Standards Act holds two separate entities as employers if 
the purported employer exerts significant control, direct or indirect, over 
                                                          
202 Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.011 (2015) (explaining that licensee behavior that reflects 
discredit upon the gaming industry can be considered an unsuitable method of 
operation); see also Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.010 (explaining how the Gaming Control 
Board holds licensees accountable for any actions that may affect the general 
welfare of the gaming industry). 
203 See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2015) (if found to be a joint employer, the licensee 
could be liable individually for labor violations of venue employees). 
204 Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.011 (2015). 
205 April 2009 Industry Notice, supra note 16, at 1. 
206 Light et al., supra note 2. 
207 See, e.g., Lewis v. Nevada Property 1, LLC, No. 2:12–cv–01564–MMD–GWF, 
2013 WL 237098 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2013); Allison, supra note 62. 
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essential elements of the employees.208 FLSA regulations provide that all joint 
employers are held individually liable for the wage and hour violations of their 
employees.209 Gaming licensees should be aware of the legal ramifications of a 
joint employer relationship with their venue operators. The public trust of the 
gaming industry in Nevada might be affected if residents become more aware 
of the labor violations that occur in the casinos. 
The Nevada gaming authorities could also exercise their authority over 
gaming licensees to ensure labor conditions of venue employees are in accord 
with federal and state labor laws. Weighing the costs and benefits of 
implementing wage and hour audits of venues, the overall outcome would be in 
the best interest of the employees who have less negotiating powers than the 
corporations. Even if a court will not hold a casino liable for wage and 
overtime violations, it is within the Nevada gaming authorities ambit to 
discipline a casino for acting in violation of federal and state labor laws.210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
208 See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3) (2015). 
209 See id. § 791.2(a). 
210 See generally Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.010 (2015) (stating that Nevada gaming 
authorities may discipline a licensee for using unsuitable operational methods). 
